Bail suggests that Sydney – with its beautiful beaches and bright sunlight, its convict heritage and its breezy self-confidence – is a place unfit for the kind of introspection required of the philosopher. Even if the environment were more conducive to philosophical reflection, by the time this country began ‘standing on its own two feet’, the important philosophical questions ‘had more or less been settled’. All that remained were mere paltry questions of exegesis.

Bail would presumably be astonished by the publication of this 700-page volume dedicated to the achievements of Australasian philosophy, the great majority of which concerns developments since World War II, many of them occurring in Sydney – and, for that matter, long after the epoch when such problems were meant to be solved. Nor is this the first such attempt to tell the story of Australasian philosophy: two notable earlier efforts are Selwyn Grave’s A History of Philosophy in Australia (1984)and James Franklin’s Corrupting the Youth: A History of Philosophy in Australia (2003).

The Companion, which contains entries from nearly 200 contributors, bears witness to the richness and significance of the Australasian contribution to English-speaking philosophy, especially over the past sixty years. In many areas of philosophical enquiry, philosophers from the antipodes have been more than simple purveyors of the most recent developments in Europe or North America, have influenced the debates themselves. This is especially true in metaphysics and philosophy of mind where people such as David Armstrong, Frank Jackson, J.J.C. Smart and David Chalmers have developed distinctive doctrines. But it would be a mistake to think this contribution is restricted to these two areas, since important work has also been undertaken in political philosophy, logic, ethics, and epistemology. One need only think of the important work of the bioethicist and animal rights activist Peter Singer to realise that Australasian philosophers have been concerned with more than just universals and the relationship between the mind and brain.

Arranged in alphabetical order, the Companion provides, for the curious as well as the cognoscenti, an essential guide to the central debates and major currents of thought within Australasian philosophy. Inside, we find reports on the histories of most departments and research centres in the region, discussions of local work on seemingly obscure doctrines such as functionalism, consequentialism, existentialism, and dualism, and accounts of how certain sub-disciplines, such as bioethics and the philosophy of mind, have developed, and finally biographical entries on significant figures. It is a volume into which one can continually dip and discover new items of great interest.

Can one observe a regional mode of thinking among all of these contributions? Is there a distinctive antipodean philosophical style? In the past, some commentators on the Australian scene have attempted to draw a connection between the hard-nosed realism of many of the most well-known local figures and the supposedly no-nonsense character of the Australian people. As partial evidence, defenders of this idea often point to Australian Materialism – according to which the mind is ‘nothing-but’ the brain – which many philosophers in the 1960s and 1970s saw as a defining feature of our thinking. This was regarded as a common project. Our contribution to the world of ideas would be to rid the world of belief in non-material things. No such common purpose exists today. Indeed, reading the Companion, one is constantly struck by the diversity of ideas and philosophical styles. And the claim that one could connect substantive philosophical doctrines to national characteristics was always implausible.

Undoubtedly, the most controversial aspect of the Companion is the inclusion of a set of biographical entries. Singling out some philosophers for special attention was always going to be an activity fraught with considerable danger for a publication of this kind, and the five editors note in their introduction that it was an innovation foisted upon them by the publisher. Unsurprisingly, it has already met with some negative commentary: notably in the Australian edition of The Spectator where Peter Coleman fulminates on David Stove’s absence.

Coleman attempts to explain the omission in terms of the long-standing Sydney–Melbourne rivalry and Stove’s mocking of the ways of Melbourne philosophers. But this hardly squares with the evidence, since one striking omission is the Melbourne philosopher Raimond Gaita, the author of a number of important philosophical works. Nonetheless, there are genuine grounds for concern here, since the Companion will undoubtedly play a role in the ongoing formation of the canon of significant Australasian thinkers. I see no problems whatsoever with the list of thinkers included – indeed, they are all worthy members of the canon – it is the omissions that are of concern. It would perhaps have been better not to include these entries at all.

Another surprising feature of the book is the attention devoted to ‘continental philosophy’. For many years now, a distinction has been drawn between continental and analytic philosophy, and the arguments between thinkers on both sides of the divide have often been quite bitter. It is difficult to explain the difference between these traditions without engaging in some kind of ‘persuasive definition’ in which one praises one side at the expense of the other. However, for the purposes of brevity, we might say that analytic philosophy focuses on the analysis of propositions and inference, whereas continental philosophy has been far more concerned with how one’s historical situation places limits on what ideas it is possible for one to conceive. We need not debate the relative merits of each approach here, but in the Australasian context it is exceedingly oddto focus so extensively on the continental strand in our thought, since it has had far less impact on the international scene. (By the way, if Bail has continental philosophy exclusively in mind, then that might explain his negative take on our intellectual history.)

Despite the significant achievements of Australasian philosophers, the perception of Australasia as a region of unintellectual hedonists remains, a prejudice that literary works such as Bail’s only serve to perpetuate. One might hope that the Companion will go some way towards addressing the lack of recognition among the general public and that, in its own small way, it might have some such effect, though it is unlikely that the kind of philosophy for which Australasian philosophers are most well known is ever likely to strike a chord with the average person.

Of more concern – although it is not unconnected – is the thought that the glory days of Australasian philosophy might be behind us. Funding cuts to the Humanities in most universities, as many readers will be aware, have undermined the ability of formerly great departments to sustain research at the level to which we have become accustomed. Many of our finest young philosophers have left in search of better opportunities.

Perhaps this is an overly negative reading of the situation, and the golden age will continue. Either way, the Companion stands as a faithful record of what has been a remarkable intellectual achievement from a part of the world in which some sceptics believe geist could not dwell.