David McKnight’s Populism Now! The case for progressive populism has the merit of reminding us of this ‘thinness’, arguing that while right-wing populism might be the main political symptom of the numerous injustices nowadays afflicting Western, liberal democracies, including Australia, left-wing populism can be their cure. In defending his argument, McKnight also cites recent examples of successful left-wing populist parties in Western Europe, such as Spain’s Podemos and Greece’s Syriza. (Surprisingly, he does not mention prominent left-wing populist politicians such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez or Bolivia’s Evo Morales, key representatives of the so-called ‘third wave’ of Latin American populism.)

What are the injustices that, according to McKnight, progressive populism could help to counter? Through a detailed and well-documented analysis, McKnight shows how over the past few decades in Australia, socio-economic inequality has deepened; climate change has been pushed to the margins of the political agenda due to the presence of an increasingly powerful fossil fuel élite; privatisation has enriched inefficient private businesses at the expense of ordinary citizens; jobs have become more precarious; tax evasion among the super-rich has become widespread; and, finally, predatory banking has almost entirely replaced the traditional role of banks, i.e. that of being at the service of individuals and businesses within the community. The common thread running through all these injustices is, according to McKnight, easy to identify: the interests of the élite, or more precisely of the ‘corporate and political elite’, have become the driving force of political decision-making in Australia, whereas those of the common people have been almost entirely neglected. Progressive populism, McKnight argues, would provide a solution to this state of affairs by driving mass mobilisation against the dominance of neo-liberal élites, and leading to policy reforms aimed at countering the aforementioned injustices.

While McKnight’s argument is, at first sight, appealing, one puzzling problem seems to run throughout his book: the absence (or near absence) of political parties. The aforementioned Podemos and Syriza, which McKnight enthusiastically cites, are political parties. And yet when it comes to proposing strategies for progressive populist social mobilisation in Australia, parties are strangely absent from McKnight’s account. Indeed, he explicitly states that ‘[c]ontemporary governments and the political parties which form them are not designed to act in the long term’, and that progressive populism ‘[does not] require the formation of a new political party’. Instead, McKnight’s emphasis is on the need for ‘a powerful social movement’, or ‘a broad, united front for social change’.

This is problematic. Much has been written in recent years regarding the crisis of political parties in the Western world, manifested, for example, in parties’ increased inability to provide a linkage between ordinary citizens and the state, and to offer sufficiently diverse political platforms. Yet parties remain the key political players in liberal democracies, and, if suitably reformed (e.g. through various mechanisms of intra-party democracy), they could help fulfil two of the key tasks that McKnight considers necessary for countering the injustices fuelled by neo-liberal élites.

First, political parties can put forward political programs that reflect the common good rather than factional interests. They are encouraged to do so by the need to appeal to, and combine the interests of, different sectors of society, a point repeatedly stressed by those contemporary political theorists and political scientists who have rediscovered the historical roots of parties and partisanship in recent times. However, while placing ‘the philosophy of the common good’ at the centre of his progressive populist agenda, McKnight entrusts its realisation not to parties but to a not well defined social movement. Yet social movements rarely aim to advance the common good of an entire society. Instead, as prominent scholars of populism Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser have argued, they tend to advance the interests of specific social groups, such as pensioners, workers, or students. Second, unlike most political parties, social movements are often short-lived, as the case of the Occupy Wall Street movement shows. This makes it difficult for them to advance long-term goals, such as the fight against climate change or the demanding socio-economic reforms invoked by McKnight. Parties’ organisational structures, often built and consolidated over many decades, offer more credible channels for advancing the kind of changes invoked by McKnight, especially if suitably reformed and democratised.

Syriza at the People's Assembly 'No More Austerity' march in London, 2014 (Flickr)

But it is not only McKnight’s emphasis on social movements that signals a tension amid the advancement of the common good. It is the very essence of progressive populism that, behind its apparent ‘common good’ façade, conceals a sectarian dimension. McKnight does not particularly conceal this aspect, as he explicitly states that ‘progressive populism puts the interests of ordinary people first, beginning with their economic interests’. This is not the same as defending the ‘common good’, which would require explanation as to how the reforms invoked by McKnight would benefit both ordinary people and those who are currently members of the élite, or, to quote Jan-Werner Müller, devising ‘an approach that seeks to bring in those currently excluded … while also keeping the very wealthy and powerful from opting out of the system’. Parties are better equipped at this task than social movements.

A further aspect of McKnight’s analysis is ambiguous. While arguing that, unlike right-wing populism, ‘[p]rogressive populism refuses to define standards of citizenship in racial, ethnic or religious terms’, he also claims that ‘[g]overnments should give their first allegiance to local residents’, and therefore should be entitled to establish immigration schemes accordingly. On what grounds does McKnight reach this conclusion? How would he respond to those political theorists who have defended a human right to immigrate and therefore rejected the very idea of immigration schemes based on a state’s right to exclude foreigners? Unfortunately, McKnight’s book does not provide an answer to these crucial questions. This ambiguity, together with McKnight’s neglect of political parties, suggests that the diagnosis offered by Populism Now! may well be persuasive, but its prescription is unsatisfactory and raises more questions than it answers.