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Braham Dabscheck reviews Australias Own Cold War: The waterfront under Menzies by Tom Sheridan
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Contents Category: Politics
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Article Title: The sharpest sword
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Custom Highlight Text: The most recent cause célèbre of Australian industrial relations was the 1998 waterfront dispute, when the Howard government failed to destroy the Maritime Union of Australia. The Australian waterfront has been a continuing site of struggle since the famous industrial disputes of the 1890s. Tom Sheridan’s Australia’s Own Cold War: The Waterfront Under Menzies helps to remind us of the intense and bitter nature of industrial relations in that industry. Readers will find themselves making comparisons with the 1998 dispute and with other major events which have occurred in Australia’s political history.
Book 1 Title: Australia's Own Cold War
Book 1 Subtitle: The waterfront under Menzies
Book Author: Tom Sheridan
Book 1 Biblio: MUP, $49.95 pb, 389 pp
Book 1 Author Type: Author
Book 1 Readings Link: https://www.booktopia.com.au/australia-s-own-cold-war-tom-sheridan/book/9780522853858.html
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Sheridan is one of Australia’s leading labour historians. He has produced a string of scholarly articles and two seminal monographs: Mindful Militants: The Amalgamated Engineering Union in Australia 1920–72 (1975) and Division of Labour: Industrial Relations in the Chifley Years 1945–1949 (1989). Australia’s Own Cold War provides penetrating insights into the inner workings of Australian industrial relations, and will cement Sheridan’s place as a doyen of Australian scholarship.

All of Sheridan’s work is characterised by two major features. First, it is based on a close reading of an extensive range of archival sources and documents. He finds humour in so-called theoretical procrastinations and unfounded musings. He draws on archival records to debunk ‘nonsense’ statements. Second, Sheridan has been concerned with the ways in which state institutions in Australia, especially since World War II, have interfered in the operation of labour markets on behalf of employers: restricting and restraining the ability of unions and workers to improve wages and working conditions during a period of full employment. For example, it should not be forgotten that the Chifley government brought in troops to defeat miners in an industrial dispute in 1949. Sheridan’s work constitutes a series of studies on regulation versus the market; of regulation on behalf of employers; and of what will be referred to as ‘corporate socialism’.

In Australia’s Own Cold War, Sheridan documents how the Commonwealth government, various government departments – especially the Department of Labour and National Service (DLNS), under its secretary Sir Henry Bland, various instrumentalities created to regulate the waterfront, courts, industrial tribunals and the army – combined to restrict the ability of the Waterside Workers’ Federation (WWF) to advance its members’ interests.

The Menzies years were a period of intense anti-communism. In the early 1950s, during the Korean War, legislation was passed to ban the Communist Party. This was later declared invalid by the High Court. The Menzies government then introduced a referendum to ban the Communist Party, which was lost in a closely fought and bitter campaign. This was followed by the Petrov Affair, the Split in the Labor Party, and incessant claims of communist dominance of unions and the ALP. In the following decade, Australia embarked on its Vietnam venture and introduced conscription to increase troop numbers.

Sheridan maintains that the majority of wharfies were Labor Party supporters and resented claims ‘that they were mere puppets on a communist string’. They appointed communist leaders such as the charismatic Jim Healy because, as one journalist stated, they were seen as ‘the sharpest sword with which to hack their way to gains’. The WWF had a democratic structure which provided autonomy for members to initiate action at separate ports. Whenever such action occurred or more industry-wide conferences with the WWF became difficult for state actors or employers, the WWF was attacked for refusing to abide by the rule of law and seeking the destruction of the ‘Australian way of life’. Kicking the communist can, according to Sheridan, was a hallmark of the Menzies government. It helped to achieve short-term political objectives and a long-term goal of countering attempts by unions to improve wages and working conditions. State actors did not trust employers to negotiate with the WWF. They were fearful that the WWF would pick off employers in enterprise bargaining. State actors supported the use of a highly regulated and centralised industry structure to restrain the WWF. If the WWF tried to obtain a concession from a particular employer, it would be translated into an attack on the whole structure; a structure constructed and maintained by the state. Moreover, such disputes would be seen as an attack on the government itself. Sheridan found a handwritten note from industrial regulator Sir Richard Kirby to DLNS Minister Harold Holt to this effect. He also refers to similar documents from Sir Henry Bland and examines various strategies he employed to restrain the ability of the WWF. Holt also criticised the employers.

The revelation of such material may cast an interesting light on the early history of Sir Richard Kirby’s career as an industrial regulator and on the image portrayed by his biographer, Blanche d’Alpuget (Mediator: A biography of Sir Richard Kirby [1977]). More significantly, Sheridan’s reporting of such material provides a significant challenge to the ‘separation of powers’ notion, which apparently is the basis of our system of governance, and to the claim that industrial regulators base their decisions on evidence and material presented to them in, and only in, proceedings in the tribunal.

Stevedoring companies were essentially subsidiaries of shipping companies, where the former was regarded as secondary to the latter. The culture of the stevedoring companies was an offshoot of British shipping, with a highly developed sense of the importance of managerial prerogatives. Stevedoring employers acted as a cartel. Australia’s Own Cold War confirms the traditional critique of economists concerning monopoly. Stevedoring companies, often inefficient, did not invest in new facilities and rarely in new technology. Australia and Britain were late converts to containerisation and were lax in the coordination and supervision of labour and in the provision of basic amenities for workers. They expected to be, and were, bailed out by state actors whenever their dealings with the WWF became difficult. Moreover, their requests for increases in freight rates, which were invariably higher than general increase in prices, were meekly acceded to by the government.

It is tempting to look back at the Menzies era and contrast it with the apparent acceptance of enterprise bargaining in recent times. The two periods may seem discordant, but they are not. State institutions, in Menzies’ time, believed that employers would be defeated in an environment of free collective bargaining; employers needed to be protected. Nowadays, the communist threat is no longer relevant. The WWF’s reincarnation, the Maritime Union of Australia, has been a frequent target of those opposed to unionism and was clearly in the sights of the Howard government when the latter assumed power in 1996. When Howard lost the 1998 waterfront dispute, a new solution was required. Legislation in the building and construction industry, and, more generally, the 2005 Work Choices Act, severely limit the ability of unions to pursue collective bargaining with employers. The Howard government, like that of Menzies, prefers regulation to the market. Corporate socialism is alive and well in Australia.

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