This is an ambitious project firmly centred in the republican tradition, one among competing conceptions of liberty that shape contemporary political philosophy. Pettit has spent decades exploring and developing this strand of thinking, notably in his influential text Republicanism (1997) and a recent study of democratic theory, On the People’s Terms (2012). Just Freedom draws together this work into an elegant program for political life.

To make his case, Pettit begins with a history of republican thinking. In the Roman conception, freedom implied control over your personal affairs. At home this required freedom from the dominion of others; in political life it suggested constraints on the power of imperium, the state. This was given functional expression in short terms for officials and a regular division of power. Two consuls led the republic, elected each for only a year.

The Roman model of a mixed constitution, notes Pettit, influenced political thinking into contemporary times. It can be seen still in institutions established after the American Revolution, and in constitutional monarchies such as Britain. Yet not everyone was persuaded by the individual notion of freedom inherited from the classical world. Jeremy Bentham saw a role for the state in protecting the liberties of citizens, though with limits to state intervention in private life. John Stuart Mill went further, advocating a positive responsibility to look after the material welfare of citizens so that they can participate as equals in political life. The Mill program shapes much of modern liberalism.

For Pettit, freedom in the republican tradition requires non-interference by others so people are sovereign in their own domain. It means, in the colloquial, not being under the thumb of anyone else, in our private space or in public life. Citizens should not be subject to control by a spouse, employer, or corporation. Instead, they control their own world and have a say as equals in the policies of the political community.

Philip Pettit (Credit: Frank Wojciechowski)

This sounds deceptively simple. Yet, as Pettit fills out the details, his implications become more sharply edged. Pettit seeks freedom with depth and breadth. We must be independent from the influence of others to make our own decisions, and have the capacity to decide across a wide array of issues. Choices that do not interfere with the rights of others should be unconstrained, with freedom of speech, practice, association, and ownership protected by law. When shared decisions are required, democracy must be meaningful so that the state acts with consent and not imperium.

To be just, the state must treat people as equals. Social arrangements should meet the eyeball test: a capacity to look in the eyes of our fellow citizens without fear or deference.

With freedom defined as justice, Pettit offers principles for good government. The state must legislate for liberties and ensure that people have resources and capabilities to exercise these rights. The state should protect freedom through secure borders, a stable legal order, education, markets, and adequate public facilities. It must fight crime and pay careful attention to those most at risk of domination from family, employers, and rapacious corporations.

This republican model rejects the claims of libertarian thinking. Pettit does not equate freedom with laissez-faire societies, with their huge inequalities and chaotic protection for individuals. For Pettit, a democratic state is essential for civic and economic order. It is required to protect freedom from domination.

Yet a state can also endanger liberty, and in the second part of the book Pettit moves from individual freedom to those institutions necessary for liberty. Here Pettit stresses the importance of democracy. Citizens must share equally in controlling the state. This should be expressed both in constitutional arrangements and the habitual actions of political life. By requiring all people to be treated equally, a community places constraints on political decisions.

In particular, Pettit is concerned with preventing government power from being usurped by private interests which can prove ‘enemies of democracy’, kept in check only by constant public vigilance. He favours a complex overlay of institutions, some subject to popular will, others such as an electoral commission empowered to pursue an agreed purpose outside the political contest. Some problems, Pettit suggests, require ‘dividing, constraining, regulating, and sometimes even sidestepping elected officials’. This can be important when protecting minorities from majoritarian domination.

To complete his argument, Pettit applies the same logic to international politics. Just as we should not be dominated by others, nor live in an oppressive society, so international bodies must reflect control by member states and a commitment to principles of freedom. Like people, states should enjoy deep sovereignty, reflected in international law and again tested by whether states can look at each other without fear or deference.

Inevitably, this approach raises the question of how democratic nations deal with oppressive states. A republican approach departs from the Westphalian orthodoxy of non-intervention in the affairs of other states. Instead, the point of an international order is to ensure individual liberties. It is reasonable, and sometimes necessary, to criticise states which fail to deliver such freedoms. In some circumstances, people have a right to appeal to the international community when dealing with impoverishment and oppression from an unjust state.

From a simple principle – freedom means the absence of domination, and the right, capacity, and opportunity to make independent choices – Pettit has constructed an impressive set of prescriptions for political life. He describes this as a ‘moral compass’, but it is more accurately a manifesto for political action underpinned by democratic institutions. When democracy operates as it should, policy proposals must appeal to notions of justice and freedom.

Just Freedom is a small and very readable book. Pettit adds a neat summary of the logic for those readers who, he hopes, might return to the volume after mulling over its argument. The book is written with an eye to the conversation from which it flows. Pettit accepts that many will agree with his definition of freedom but struggle with the recommendations that follow.

Just Freedom is an impressive contribution. It works from a profound tradition of republican thinking yet offers an original, and largely compelling, reading of how principles could shape practice. Like the best participants in a dialogue, Pettit draws from, and adds to, the exchange of ideas. At a time when many political parties have lost much semblance of platform or ideology, Pettit offers principles to guide action. Just Freedom deserves a wide readership, and many discussions to follow.